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Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An
Examination of the Current Controversy
W. Harold Bigham* & C. Dent Bostick**
I. INTRODUCTION
For the last 45 years the idea that local zoning administration is a
highly desirable exercise of the state police power has become progres-
sively more entrenched in urban thinking and planning. Although oppo-
nents of zoning have quarreled with details of administration or decried
the failure of the Supreme Court to continuously oversee implementa-
tion of the zoning concept, they have assumed basic Euclidian zoning
theory' to be beyond serious challenge. This assumption is no longer
valid, for classic municipal zoning is on the firing line and its survival
is by no means certain.
As the United States enters the last three decades of this century,
its cities are declining with startling rapidity. Urban decay, which has
brought the cities of a nation comprising six percent of the world's
population and consuming 30 percent of its wealth to the point of col-
lapse, is a shock to many Americans, and a puzzle whose solution so
far has eluded the nation's best efforts. Part of the dilemma of the
modern American city stems from the complex relationship between the
central city and the suburb, for whatever may be said about motive, an
effective function of municipal planning devices, especially the zoning
device, has been to exclude the relatively less affluent from the suburbs.
This exclusion has occurred at the same time that jobs have become
progressively scarcer in the central city because of the development of
suburb-based industry. A peculiar commuting pattern has developed in
which white collar and professional workers commute from suburb to
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1954, University of the South; J.D. 1960
Vanderbilt University.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1952, J.D. 1958, Mercer University. This
paper was prepared under the terms of a grant from the Urban and Regional Development Center
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1. See notes 17-19 infra & accompanying text.
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city, while blue collar workers commute from city to suburb.
One explanation for the exodus to suburbia is the automobile and
the opportunity for mobility that it offers.2 Equally significant, however,
is the notably enhanced economic opportunity since World War II,
which has created a much expanded middle class among blacks and
whites. Indeed, United States Department of Commerce studies show
a fifteen percent decline from 1959 to 1967 in the number of families
living in poverty areas;3 the white exodus, however, represented an
eighteen percent drop in poverty area population-a rate double that
represented by black departures.4 One study has estimated that if pres-
ent trends continue, 50 percent of New York City's population will be
Negro and Puerto Rican by 1985.5 To reverse this trend and to achieve
a uniform ethnic composition in city and suburbs by the year 2001,
almost 1,000,000 more Negroes and Puerto Ricans than presently pro-
jected would have to suburbanize by 1985, and another 700,000 between
1985 and 2000.6
Meanwhile, as the cities cope with crime, racial tension, massive
welfare systems, and marginal schools, their tax bases are steadily
eroded by the flight of industry and the affluent. Thus the problem is
not simply a racial one, though certainly there are racial overtones; it
is rather a problem of wealth and poverty, and as such, its solution is
as elusive as the determination of who is rich and who is poor. Neverthe-
less, as talent, money, and thought have been directed to the definition
and analysis of urban problems, it has become apparent that the same
forces that led the civil rights battles of the 1950's and 1960's are gather-
ing again for a new push-this time toward economic and racial integra-
tion of the suburbs-a push that may be far more dramatic than any
past assault on American social patterns.
The movement toward change takes at least three directions-one
is the federal government's efforts to built vast quantities of subsidized
housing in the suburbs. Such an effort is apparent in the federal govern-
ment's "Operation Breakthrough," a presently underfinanced program
to subsidize low-cost housing.7 The most formidable obstacle to this
2. Shipler, New Highways Shaping Future of City's Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1971,
at 1, col. 1.
3. NATIONAL COMMITrEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, TRENDS IN HOUSING,
May 1970, at 1.
4. Id.
5. REGIONAL PLAN NEWS, No. 91, Sept. 1969, at 10.
6. Id. at 11.
7. C. EDSON & B. LANE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LOW AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSING
§§ 17:02-03; Loehwing, Homebuilding Boom, BARRON'S, Mar. 1, 1971, at 3; Reichley, George
Romney Is Running Hard at HUD, FORTUNE, Dec. 1970, at 100.
1112 [Vol. 25
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING PRACTICES
program is that the necessary land is in the suburbs, and suburbanites
do not want a large influx of subsidized city dwellers. Although the
federal government may encourage the development of federally subsi-
dized housing, it is obvious from the President's statement of June 11,
1971,8 that there will be no "compelled" acceptance of low-cost housing
by the present administration. Even less successful have been efforts in
Congress to give federal aid bonuses to communities that lower barriers
to low-income housing."
A second direction is taken by advocates who promote change
through the state legislatures; 0 this approach, however, has produced no
more of a substantial, nationwide change than the federal effort, at the
same time that suburban attitudes are hardening and becoming more
hostile. The third, and most travelled, route at present is through the
courts. There, a significant legal challenge is developing to the kind of
economic discrimination that is both a cause and a product of the
municipal planning devices currently in use. It is with that challenge that
this Article deals.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Modem zoning is the creation of industrialization, population con-
centration, and the activities of a fervently dedicated group of propo-
nents, who early in the century propagandized the concept to wide
public acceptance. So-called "Euclidean" zoning is today's most widely
employed land use control. It is variously praised for its ingenuity,
cursed for its Balkanization of cities, and questioned as having no use-
fulness at all." Perhaps too much has been expected of zoning, since
zoning laws are often essentially prospective and negative in concept, as
are the law of nuisance, subdivision regulations, and most privately
imposed covenants, the other traditional land use devices. Nevertheless,
its early victories were regarded by progressive forces as triumphs of
enlightenment and social advancement; zoning was peculiarly an idea
whose time had come.
Those who developed modem zoning from primitive forms and
who obtained judicial approval for it employed remarkable talent in
devising a theory of the legitimate exercise of police power that was able
8. Statement by President Richard M. Nixon on federal policies on equal housing opportun-
ity, June 11, 1971. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1971, at 1, col. 8; id. at 14, col. 2.
9. On October 14, 1969, Senator Jacob Javits introduced a bill to provide bonuses to com-
munities that lower their zoning barriers. S. 3025, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The bill failed to
pass in the Senate.
10. See notes 166-89 infra and accompanying text.
1I. See generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP
AND USE 823 (1968); 1 J. METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 52 (2d ed. 1955).
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to withstand charges of constitutional impermissibility. 2 All the appeal-
ing arguments of state intervention to protect the populace in matters
of safety, health, morals, and general welfare were mustered and articu-
lated in terms of provision for adequate sanitation, prevention of the
spread of fire, billboard regulation, and provision for adequate schools
and parks. Despite the unquestionable worth of these objectives, the
precise beneficial effects of zoning in advancing them have always been
hard to identify. On the other hand, a clear effect-and a generally
unstated but certainly often hoped for objective-of zoning has been the
maintenance of property values and the perpetuation of ethnically hom-
ogeneous areas by the exclusion of minority groups from residential
developments.'
3
A. Constitutionality of Zoning
Prior to the decisive case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
in 1926,11 the United States Supreme Court, employing an analogy to
the rationale of public nuisance, had recognized the principle of local
government regulation of land use. 15 Only once had the Court refused
to uphold a land use measure," but on the eve of Euclid the constitu-
tional fate of prospective land use control was a close question. A signif-
icant difference exists between the concept of zoning to eradicate a
nuisance and a theory of zoning to implement a planned development.
There was a distinct possibility that the Court would find use control
pursuant to a prospective plan to be a violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Such a finding would have been in line
with traditional views of property rights and yet would have involved
no blanket disapproval of governmental power to interfere with the use
of property.
1. The Euclid Decision.-The lower court in Euclid found exactly
12. James Metzenbaum, who represented the Village of Euclid in its successful suit, describes
at length the "efforts on the part of many noble men who consecrated themselves to the subject
for the purpose of making possible such reasonable zoning and such reasonable regulation as would
inure to the benefit of the people of this country, not for the then-present alone but for the years
to come." I J. METZENBAUM, supra note 11, at 52. He refers to the pre-Euclid campaign as the
"formative period of indoctrination." Id. at 53. Metzenbaum, discussing his role as attorney for
Euclid, anticipates Churchillian rhetoric, saying, "To have become the spokesman for so splendid
a cause, was an exceptional privilege which well warranted a consecration to the task." Id. at 57.
13. AMERICAN Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PROBLEMS OF ZONING AND LAND-USE REG-
ULATION 37 (Research Report No. 2, 1968).
14. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
15. E.g., Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
16. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
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such a constitutional violation." The matter reportedly was so close in
the Supreme Court itself that only a change of two votes on rehearing
assured the Village of Euclid of victory and granted judicial recognition
to the constitutionality of the zoning principle.' In language as particu-
larly appropriate today as when it was written more than 40 years ago,
the Court explained its radical amendment of property rights:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing
conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago,
or even a half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our
day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations. . . . And in
this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the
new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their
operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise."
2. The Aftermath of Euclid.-The Euclid language implied that
the Supreme Court would continue to exhibit concern and to exercise
supervision over the newly validated zoning power. The Court seemed
to confirm the general expectation by reviewing and declaring unconsti-
tutional a zoning ordinance only two years after the Euclid decision, °2
but prospects of continuing close supervision were illusory. Having es-
tablished the constitutionality of the zoning principle, the
Court-perhaps fearing involvement in every street corner zoning dis-
pute in the country-consistently has refused to review zoning cases
since 1928. Some of the cases the Court has refused to review have
involved ordinances so extreme that they leave no doubt of the Court's
determination to maintain its aloofness in the field of zoning.2' Thus the
Court, activist in other areas of social change since 1926, has effectively
abdicated the zoning area for two generations. In so doing, it has left
the task of developing zoning law to the states, and has entrusted the
application of federal constitutional standards in zoning cases to state
courts.
17. 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924). Metzenbaum comments that the district court found not
only that the application of the zoning ordinance to complainant's land was unreasonable and
unconstitutional, but also that the comprehensive zoning ordinance was fundamentally and basi-
cally illegal and unsupportable as a violation of the state and federal constitutions. J.
METZENBAUM, supra note 11, at 56-57.
18. See McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 710, 712 (1946).
19. 272 U.S. at 387.
20. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
21. E.g., State ex reL Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W. 2d
217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). See generally Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community
Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 199, 208 (1955).
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B. Zoning in the States
1. State Legislation. -Even before the fundamental constitu-
tional proposition had been settled, the states had moved quickly in the
early 1920's to legislate zoning statutes.2 Although scattered regula-
tions governing height, fire zones, building sanitation, and nuisance had
existed since earliest colonial times, the first ordinance worthy of the
name "comprehensive zoning regulation" was enacted in New York
City in 1916.2? That ordinance, most notable for its exaggerated as-
sumptions about the future,24 is nonetheless important as the country's
first comprehensive zoning of height, areas, and use.?1 The ordinance is
also significant in that it proceeded on principles of police power and
not eminent domain; at the time, the constitutional validity of this
approach was highly questionable.? The most significant pre-Euclid
development, in national terms, was the publication in 1926 of the Stan-
dard State Zoning Enabling Act by an advisory committee of the De-
partment of Commerce? Today every state has enabling legislation or
direct constitutional provisions that grants zoning power to all cities or
to classes of cities; most states permit counties to zone as well.28
Despite the overwhelming change in social, legal, and economic
conditions since 1926, the popularity of the original model has endured.
Most state statutes are closely patterned after the standard enabling act,
lending a certain uniformity to the statutory provisions.2 In the emerg-
ing struggle with which this Article deals, perhaps the most significant
22. By 1922, 20 states had passed enabling acts to facilitate local zoning. Kimball, A Review
of City Planning in the United States, 1920-21, 2 NAT'L MUN. REV. 27 (1922). By 1930, enabling
acts or existing constitutional authority had granted the right to municipalities in all 48 states to
adopt zoning ordinances. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF ZONING LAWS AND ORDINANCES
ADOPTED DURING 1930, at 203 (1931).
23. See I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.07 (1968). This ordinance was
sustained in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920).
24. See C. BERGER, supra note 11, at 618 n.36 (1968).
25. E. BASSETr, ZONING 23 (1940).
26. Id. at 27.
27. This recommended act permitted the regulation and restriction of height, number of
stories, and size of buildings; percentage of lot that could be occupied; size of yards and courts;
density of population; and location and use of various types of structures-all for the purpose of
promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community. See I A. RATHKOPF,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 3-1 (1969).
28. 8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.37 (3d ed. 1965); U.S. HOUSING
& HOME FINANCE AGENCY, COMPETITIVE RIGHT OF MUNICIPAL & COURT ZONING ENABLING
STATUTES ii (1952).
29. By 1925, even before its formal recommendation by the Committee, 19 states had
adopted the model in whole or in part. C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 148 (1959). It remains a
popular model today, although there have been some important changes, and undoubtedly the
developing litigation on zoning is causing a rethinking of some of its basic premises.
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provision in the entire standard act is that which names the "legislative
body of cities and incorporated villages as the recipient of the power to
regulate.'30 As this Article will later indicate, the designation of the
local government as the decision maker for the general welfare, seem-
ingly so desirable an arrangement in times past, may ultimately prove
to be the weakness that leads to a dramatic curtailment of permissible
exercises of zoning power. 1 One who writes in this field is impressed
continually that the general welfare of the local municipality may be a
chief cause of general detriment to the larger community just beyond
the municipal limits. Nevertheless, the comparatively infinitesimal size
of a local incorporated area does not prevent that community's exercis-
ing legislative zoning power for the general welfare of only that tiny unit
of government. For example, there are more than 1,000 local govern-
ment units laying down zoning rules in the Chicago area; there are
approximately 1,400 such units in the environs of New York City.32 An
obvious alternative to such narrowly based decision making is metropol-
itan zoning power, and some attempts have been made in this direc-
tion.3 Primarily, however, relief from the effects of fragmented gen-
eral welfare decisions continues to be sought in the courts.
2. State Courts.-The basic constitutionality of state enabling
zoning statutes has not been a viable issue for four decades. The consti-
tutional questions litigated in state courts during this time have dealt
only with specific ordinances enacted under the authority of the enabling
acts; even in these cases, specific manageable guidelines have never been
developed against which an ordinance may be measured. The statutes,
without clear standards, require only that the ordinances prohibit things
harmful to health, morals, safety, and welfare.3 4 Generally, therefore,
the question is whether the ordinance, as applied to a particular parcel,
at a particular time, under existing circumstances, deprives the owner
of his property without due process of law or operates to deny him the
equal protection of the law. 5 Under the due process clause, which has
30. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 1 (1926),
reprinted in 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 27, at 100-1.
31. The rapid movement of industry to the suburbs away from traditional core city sources
of labor residence has created a new class of "aggrieved persons" in fact, who nonetheless have
no standing to challenge zoning at the new site of their jobs under traditional tests of standing.
32. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 22, 1970, at 39.
33. Note, Extending Standing to Nonresidents-A Response to the Exclusionary Effects of
Zoning Fragmentation, 24 VAND L. REV. 340 (1971).
34. See Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), affd, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); 1
A. RATHKOPF, supra note 27, at 2-2.
35. Professor Sager has described the new and old equal protection and evaluated the new
concepts evolved by the Supreme Court since 1954. Sager, Tight Little Islands. Exclusionary
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provided the conventional route of attack on zoning ordinances, the
courts have insisted that zoning restrictions bear a real relationship to
the public welfare and not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or discrimina-
tory.38 Opponents have typically charged the ordinance as being unrea-
sonable, and consequently unconstitutional, in that it is either confisca-
tory, arbitrary, or discriminatoryY The issue thus raised is not whether
some of the attributes of property ownership have been diminished by
the ordinance, for undoubtedly some have been, but whether too much
diminution has occurred to be permitted. More specifically, an ordi-
nance is said to be confiscatory if the property to which it is applied is
not suitable for any of the permitted uses, arbitrary if there is no reason-
able relationship between the evils apprehended and the ordinance pro-
visions designed to prevent or cure them, and discriminatory if the
ordinance does not operate evenly on all persons or property in like
circumstances.
3 8
C. The Failure of the Courts to Resolve Zoning Problems
Although there has been a notable uniformity in philosophy and
procedure from state to state in the treatment of zoning disputes, there
have been predictable differences in emphasis and thrust. The due pro-
cess approach, which investigates the relation of the ordinance to health,
safety, morals, or public welfare, has led to widely divergent results
when applied to specific zoning restrictions, such as large lot require-
ments. Furthermore, one of the most consistent and most criticized
trends has been the tendency of state appellate courts to defer to local
legislative bodies on difficult problems of zoning development. 39 This
deference can be attributed in part to a judicial feeling that courts are
inadequately equipped to deal with problems often more technical than
legal in nature. Certainly the advancing technical sophistication and
complexity of land use planning is a reality that has led to increasingly
less substitution of the court's view for the professional planner's view
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). He also explores the
ramifications and possible application of this "energized" equal protection to exclusionary zoning
power.
36. 6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 871, at 153.7-.8 (1971); 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note
27, at 4-2. See Florka v. City of Detroit, 369 Mich. 568, 120 N.W.2d 797 (1963).
37. Powell characterizes these terms as "weasel words" usable by a court to avoid a result
it wishes to avoid while paying lip service to the "presumption of validity." 6 R. POWELL, supra
note 36, at 153.8-.9.
38. 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 27, at 4-5 to -6.
39. Rogers v. North Am. Philips Co., 37 Misc. 2d 923, 236 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Shapiro v. Town of Oyster Bay, 27 Misc. 2d 844, 211 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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of what land use best serves the general welfare." This unfortunate
abdication has left the formulation of much zoning law to the more
lethargic and pressure-sensitive legislative organs of local government.
Consistently with this trend, state appellate courts that do face the
issue uniformly have presumed the validity of the local ordinance and
placed the burden of proof on the challenger of the ordinance.41 This
burden has proved so onerous that it frequently forecloses any possibil-
ity of redress for a constitutional grievance. As Judge Hall of the New
Jersey Supreme Court observed in his often-quoted dissent in Vickers
v. Township Committee,42 "our courts have . . made it virtually im-
possible for municipal zoning regulations to be successfully at-
tacked."4
3
Changing social structures and population growth have apparently
rendered obsolete this conventional response of the courts to zoning law
challenges. It is doubtful that the judiciary's tradition of measuring only
the reasonableness of zoning facts in context against the nebulous con-
cepts of public welfare, health, morals, and safety can endure much
longer. As their problems proliferate, the burgeoning cities will make it
progressively more difficult for courts to state, as they often have in the
past decade, that zoning specifications are matters of local policy and
of no concern to the court so long as they are reasonable.4
III. VULNERABLE ZONING PRACTICES
As this Article is written, lawsuits are mushrooming across the
40. This is reflected by the majority opinion in National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 521, 215 A.2d 597, 606-07 (1965), in which the court said:
"In the span of years since 1926 when zoning received its judicial blessing, the art and science
of land planning has grown increasingly complex and sophisticated. The days are fast disappearing
when the judiciary can look at a zoning ordinance and, with nearly as much confidence as a
professional zoning expert, decide upon the merits of a zoning plan and its contribution to the
health, safety, morals or general welfare .... "
41. The principle was established in Euclid and mentioned in Nectow. Further, the courts
have said that if the issue of the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is debatable, the courts will
not interfere. See, e.g., Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560,42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); Brandt
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 16 N.J. Super. 113, 84 A.2d 18 (App. Div. 1951). Although there
are courts that point to some limits on the general rule, the limits are usually expressed in generali-
ties. See, e.g., State v. Modern Box Makers, Inc., 217 Minn. 41, 13 N.W.2d 731 (1944).
42. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
43. Id. at 259, 181 A.2d at 143. In Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 296, 212
A.2d 153, 169 (1965), the New Jersey Supreme Court said that "[the board of adjustment's]
peculiar knowledge of local conditions must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of delegated
discretion. Courts cannot substitute an independent judgment for that of the boards in areas of
factual disputes . . . . So long as the power exists to do the act complained of and there is
substantial evidence to support it, the judicial branch of government cannot interfere."
44. Loveladies Property Owners Ass'n v. Barnegat City Serv. Co., 60 N.J. Super. 491, 159
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nation attacking suburban zoning policy.45 In terms of current sensitiv-
ity, there are four aspects of zoning policy around which the pending
legal battles are likely to be fought. One aspect is the large lot zoning
requirement; a second is subdivision control regulation; a third is the
minimum floor space requirement for residences; and a fourth is the
exclusion or severe numerical restriction of multifamily dwellings.46
A. Large Lot Zoning Requirements
Density control has been recognized as an appropriate object of
regulation since at least 1926, when the words "density of population"
were included in the standard form of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce.4 7 The enabling statutes of all 50 states include provisions permit-
ting ordinances designed to "prevent the overcrowding of land."48 As a
rule, ordinances requiring minimum lot areas for residential dwellings
have been justified in terms of police power exercise.49 Local legislative
bodies have doubtless been motivated by a broad spectrum of considera-
tions in enacting minimum lot size requirements, but the usual desire is
to create a valuable and enduring tax basis and a congenial and homoge-
neous neighborhood." Implementation of these restrictions has usually
resulted in an economic and class segregation of the community that has
in turn assured protection of the homogeneous character and economic
integrity of the neighborhood. This inescapable characteristic of zoning
was recognized as early as the lower court decision in Euclid"1 Never-
theless, the segregationist aspect of zoning seems so inseparable from
the system that it has rarely been questioned unless the zoning provision
was so drastic as to be economically unrealistic.
1. Litigation. -Until recently, attacks on minimum lot size re-
quirements have not come from the excluded. Litigation customarily
A.2d 417 (App. Div. 1960).
45. E.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n. v.
City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc. v. Township of Concord, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
46. Fanale v. Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958).
47. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926), reprinted
in 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 27, at 100-1.
48. 3 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 27, at 100-1 to -6.
49. See, e.g., Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962).
The city contended in support of the reasonableness of minimum lot sizes imposed by ordinance
that "[t]he present zoning of the subject parcels would create the maximum density of population
that could be serviced by available sanitary sewers, and, therefore, bears a direct relation to the
public health, safety and general welfare." Id. at 513, 116 N.W.2d at 818.
50. For the motives involved in large lot zoning and its relative efficiency in attaining desired
goals see Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969).
51. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
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involves either real estate developers who complain that the ordinances
lower profits by making possible fewer houses and to that extent are
confiscatory, or property owners who contend that too many of the
prerogatives of ownership have been taken arbitrarily and without fac-
tual relation to the general welfare.52 These attacks have been notably
unsuccessful.53 As they have with other "reasonableness" issues in zon-
ing, the courts in these cases have applied a presumption that the legisla-
tive exercise is reasonable unless proved otherwise by the contestant.
Except in the clearest cases of abuse, this combination of a heavy burden
of proof and judicial deference to the legislative branch has sustained
the ordinance. "4
Reasons assigned by the judiciary for upholding minimum lot size
regulations have become more sophisticated as attacks on these provi-
sions have escalated. When first confronted with challenges to lot size
regulations, the courts tended to define reasonableness in terms of the
standard fictions of zoning objectives under the police power.5 More
recent opinions, while continuing lip service to police power analysis,
have expressed concern for the subtler considerations of standard of
living, preservation of neighborhood "character," tourist attraction,
aesthetics, and maintenance of land values. " Although the decisions
consistently declare that the primary purpose or effect of the ordinance
must be to benefit the public interest rather than private interests, a
public interest has been found even when the ordinance was construed
by zoning board members to allow property transfers only to "substan-
tial people" of "more than ample" means.57 Legislation expressed in
language subject to such interpretation has bolstered the claims of those
who contend that government, through zoning, has been used to provide
and maintain havens for the rich.
There have been some limitations on minimum lot zoning. Courts
have been reluctant to permit minimum lot restrictions when the clear
52. Senior v. Zoning Comm'r, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959); Levitt v. Village of
Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959); Dilliard v. Village of North
Hills, 276 App. Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1950).
53. But 2 examples of successful challenge on minimum lot size grounded at least partially
in arguments of economic infeasibility are National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965), and Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962).
54. But cf cases cited note 53 supra.
55. E.g., Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 III. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35 (1957); Simon v. Town
of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
56. E.g., County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967); Bilbar Constr. Co.
v. Board of Adjustments, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958); Jones v. Town of Woodway, 70 Wash.
977, 425 P.2d 904 (1967).
57. County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967).
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legislative objective has been not to direct growth, but to prevent it.
Preservation of a community's character by total prevention of change
and growth seems to be a judicially proscribed activity;" thus it has been
said that zoning cannot be used to deny the future.59 A scheme whose
admitted purpose was to funnel low-income population into an area of
the county in which governmental services could be provided more eco-
nomically has been denied enforcement."0 Even when municipal facilities
are planned to grow at a given rate, population cannot be limited to
conform to that preordained growth. 1
With few exceptions, minimum lot regulations have been upheld
when the minimum lot size was economically realistic and the regula-
tions did not impose blatantly extravagant requirements.12 The larger
the minimum size, the more difficult is the justification, for there is a
point of diminishing returns at which minimum requirements are so
high as to be confiscatory in effect. 3 Nevertheless, five-acre minimum
lots have been upheld, 4 and some communities apparently have pro-
vided for at least ten-acre minimums." The courts have been quite
permissive in permitting large lot zoning based on hazy justifications
whose relation to the general welfare is often not clear.66 Similarly, the
courts have not been demanding in requiring wealthy communities to
explain where land uses excluded by the large lot requirement should
go. Finally courts often have accepted arguments that the tax revenues
of an area are not sufficient to support the services required by a large
58. See Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964). But see Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
59. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
60. Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
61. Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
62. See, e.g., Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35 (1957) (5 acres);
Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) (5 acres); State ex reL Grant v.
Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 181 N.E.2d 905 (1960) (80,000 square feet).
63. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. City of Highland Park, 27 111. 2d 350, 189 N.E.2d 302 (1963);
Bismark v. Village of Bayville, 49 Misc. 2d 604, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
64. Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 I11. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35 (1957); Fischer v. Bedminster
Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
65. See Editorial, 94 N.J.L.J. 116 (1971), which condemns the practice of New Jersey
municipalities in encouraging immigration of desirable industry to their areas while at the same
time zoning out those who work in these industries by basic lot zoning. The editorial suggests the
legislative remedy as the most appropriate to the problem on a state-wide basis.
Despite recent flat assertions to the contrary-see Davidoff, Davidoff & Gold, Suburban
Action: Advocate Planning for an Open Society, 36 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 12 (1970), there are
now available sketchy data that indicate that blacks are moving to the suburbs in significant
numbers.




influx of lesser uses, without requiring an explanation of why the
wealthy area cannot levy increased taxes on itself to support the new
services needed.Y
2. Current Status. -Although zoning has always involved the use
of fictions to achieve some effects intended but not stated, exploitation
of this device has placed a noose around central city areas that grows
ever tighter with increasing population pressures. The direct effect on
core city spillover into the suburbs has been staggering. Within a 30-
mile radius of midtown Manhattan, there are about 210 square miles
of vacant land in Nassau, Westchester and Rockland counties. Under
current zoning ordinances, vacant land in these inner suburban counties
could accommodate about 470,000 people. If the same areas were devel-
oped at existing contiguous population densities, the same land would
accommodate 1,300,000 persons, or 900,000 more."8 In 1962, more than
two-thirds of the vacant land of the 31-county region that surrounds the
Port of New York was zoned for one-family houses on half-acre or
larger lots, regardless of the suitability of the location or terrain; about
two-fifths of this land was zoned for houses on at least an acre of land.69
As of 1966, the lot size required for about 70 percent of all undeveloped
zoned Connecticut lands was more than one acre.7" One recent report
indicates that 92 percent of all land zoned for restrictive use in Connecti-
cut is subject to lot size requirements of one-half acre or more.71
Although abuse of the large lot ordinance has brought on closer
judicial scrutiny as urban strangulation accelerates,72 there is no simple
judicial solution. Planning is a complex and imprecise art, and the
judiciary suffers from a lack of technical expertise in the field. Moreo-
ver, the motives of the municipalities that enact these ordinances may
be suspect, but they are exceedingly difficult to prove. Even more per-
plexing is the question of how relevant the municipalities' motives
should be in judicial decision making. The effect, and not the motive,
would seem to be crucial.
The large lot requirement as a planning tool has been damaged by
insensitive use, but the concept itself is a functional one and should not
67. See Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 1081 (1965).
68. Regional Plan News, No. 91, Sept. 1969, at 17.
69. Regional Plan News, No. 91, Sept. 1969, at 5-6. The Regional Plan Association suggests
on the basis of declining land availability that the problem is even more acute now.
70. Note, supra note 50.
71. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 22, 1970, at 39.




be arbitrarily discarded. Police and fire protection, sanitation, and edu-
cational facilities can be .inundated by a massive influx of population
occuring so rapidly that it outstrips bona fide efforts to provide these
services. Although it is apparently seldom used in fact as a temporary
expedient to direct orderly growth, the large lot ordinance does have this
legitimate potential utility. 3 Additionally, large lot requirements may
be useful in preventing dilution of municipal service quality stemming
from increased population density. Since large lot requirements limit
population density, they curtail the problems flowing from it-increased
demand for public services accompanied by possibly lower tax reve-
nues.7 4 The difficult judicial task is to distinguish the ordinance designed
and enforced to provide reasonable services to accommodate growth
from the ordinance designed and enforced to avoid the burdens of
growth by systematic exclusion of population.
B. Subdivision Regulations
Subdivision regulations that impose stringent requirements on the
subdivision house builder for installation of capital improvements are
closely related in their exclusionary effects to large lot requirements.
Subdivision controls, like modem zoning methods, evolved largely in
the second and third decades of this century.75 It is doubtful that exclu-
sionary designs figured prominently in the early thinking that supported
these measures; control was the important factor." Previously, the mu-
nicipality, and through it the property-owning residents of the munici-
pality, paid the entire expense of capital improvements for new subdivi-
sions within the municipality. In times of modest growth, this took the
form of paying for street, sidewalk, and sewer development in the new
areas. However, frauds and speculative building in the spiraling econ-
omy of the 1920's77 overloaded and finally swamped the fiscal structure
of the cities. The subsequent collapse of the national economy in the
Depression made mandatory a shift of the burden to the developer, 78 and
73. See Becker, The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 263,
283.
74. Id. at 284.
75. For a discussion tracing and analyzing state statutes on subdivision regulations see Note,
An Analysis of Subdivision Control Legislation, 28 IND. L.J. 544 (1953).
76. The need for control of subdivision development is obvious. Once an area is subdivided,
its direction in terms of land use is settled for a long term. This direction may be adverse to
community interest in terms of safety, health, and financial return measured against final outlay
for services in the area by the city.
77. See P. CORNICK, PREMATURE SUBDIVISION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1938); E. FISHER,
REAL ESTATE SUBDIVIDING ACTIVITY AND POPULATION GROWTH IN NINE URBAN AREAS (1928).
78. See Note, supra note 75.
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hence to the purchaser.
Subdivision control ordinances have traditionally affected curb,
gutter, sewer, sidewalk, and storm drain improvements. Courts have
had little difficulty disposing of constitutional challenges to this type of
assessment, 79 because the benefit of the capital improvements to the
burdened property is direct and obvious. More difficult challenges to
assessment came as municipalities attempted to require dedications of
land or cash fees for schools and playgrounds as a prerequisite to subdi-
vision approval. This type of assessment fared less well in the courts
than did exactions for the more visibly beneficial capital improvements
immediately incident to the subdivision lot itself.8"
Thus litigation in this area generally has not been concerned with
the objection that the subdivision control is invalid because it increases
the cost of property and makes it more difficult for the poor to buy. It
is not the exclusionary effect that has been attacked,"' but rather the
relation of the benefit to the specifically burdened property. 2 If the
controls cause the subdivider to pay more than his share of the cost to
the community of universally shared facilities, such as schools, then the
controls may be discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional. Some
writers have suggested a simple, narrow test of constitutionality that
requires the direct benefit of improvements financed by subdivision fees
to inhere exclusively in the homeowners assessed; otherwise, the fees are
unconstitutional. 3 Other writers have found this test unrealistic and
would uphold the controls when there is a nexus between the subdivision
development and the improvements built with the assessment, as long
as some method exists to relate the costs to the exactions. 4 The latter
79. E.g., Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371, 378-79 (1956);
Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 847, 851 (195 1);see Allen v. Stockwill,
210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920).
80. See Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957); Ridgemont
Dev. Co. v. City of East Detroit, 358 Mich. 387, 100 N.W.2d 301 (1960). But see Gulest Associates
v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 29 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affd, 15 App. Div. 2d
815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962). For a complete discussion of the topic see Heyman & Gilhool, The
Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through
Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
81. Some authors argue that subdivision exactions as presently implemented are too slight
to contribute significantly to an exclusionary effect. The suggestion is that exclusionary tendencies
would be better curtailed through appropriate legislative limitation on exclusive zoning, govern-
ment subsidizing of housing, and enforcement of antidiscrimination legislation applicableto single-
family housing. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 80, at 1155.
82. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961).
83. Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 405, 407
(1963).
84. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 80, at 1133 n.59.
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view seems to have found substantial approval,8 perhaps because it
seems reasonable that new residents should be charged for the enhanced
costs of educational and recreational facilities occasioned by their pres-
ence, even if it cannot be shown that the newcomers alone benefit from
the use made of their payments. Nonetheless, high requirements for
curbs and sewers, sidewalks, streets and parks, and schools raise lot
prices substantially.
Whether the exclusionary effect of increasing the cost of subdivi-
sion land beyond the reach of the poor by loading down each lot with
assessments for community capital improvements can withstand the
coming attack presents a novel and complex constitutional question.
Again, it is the effect of such action, not the motivation for it, that likely
will be subjected to close scrutiny.
C. Minimum Floor Space Requirements
A third zoning control measure likely to be attacked is the require-
ment of minimum floor space in residential buildings. Ordinances re-
quiring minimum floor space customarily are supported in terms of the
relation of the amount of living space to the health of a resident family.86
This rationale can be difficult to support logically, as was pointed out
in the scholarly debate that follows the case of Lionshead Lake, Inc. v.
Township of Wayne,87 which upheld a minimum space ordinance. In
that debate, Professors Nolan and Horack defended the decision with
a well-reasoned but narrowly defined analysis of the relationship be-
tween living space and public health.n Professor Haar, asserting a lack
of any real relationship between health and the ordinance's space re-
quirements,9 argued more broadly that the Lionshead result would fos-
ter economic and social stratification of a highly undesirable nature."
Haar's position may well form the philosophy of the developing consti-
tutional attack on the minimum floor space ordinance. The basis for
85. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). But see Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
86. See Corning v. Town of Ontario, 204 Misc. 38, 121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1953). But
minimum floor space requirements might still be struck down as being too vague. City of West
Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
87. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
88. Nolan & Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements,
67 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1954).
89. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1051 (1953); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. REV. 986
(1954).




attack is that there is little relation between minimum floor space ordi-
nances that use sliding scale controls and public health and welfare. If,
for example, it is healthy for a family of four to live in a single-story
dwelling of a required 1000 square feet, it would seem equally healthy
for the same family to live in a two-story dwelling also of 1000 square
feet." Yet some ordinances do not recognize this equivalency and in-
stead require a higher square footage for the two-story dwelling. This
distinction cannot logically advance public health; its purpose is clearly
to penalize two-story construction and to encourage one-story construc-
tion.
Far more likely as a motive for such ordinances than health and
safety concerns is the concern for maintaining a sound tax base and the
preservation of property values. Given that tax base and property values
bear a relationship to minimum building size,92 regulations designed
solely to preserve that relationship may prove an improper exercise of
the police power." In practice, the courts have adopted pragmatic rules
governing the legitimacy of minimum floor space requirements. One
authority has concluded from an analysis of the cases that the courts
will permit the minimum house size ordinance to stand if its require-
ments correspond to the average size of a single-family residential dwell-
ing insured in the FHA program, and will overturn it if the ordinance
requires a minimum size larger than the average size insured in that
program ."
D. Restrictions on Multifamily Dwellings
The final zoning device considered here as a likely subject of attack
is the restricting of multifamily residential construction, a practice to
which challenge has been developing for some years.9" As pressure for
expanded urban housing has grown, there has emerged insistent and
increasingly sophisticated resistance to construction of new apartment
projects in suburbia. Whereas local citizens formerly took pride in in-
creased population figures as a sign of healthy growth, those same
91. Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 225, 104 A.2d 118, 122 (1954); see American Veterans
Housing Co-operative, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 69 Pa. D. & C. 449, 457-58, 66 Montgo-
mery County L.R. 7, 14 (C.P. 1949).
92. See Haar, supra note 90.
93. Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Lambert, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 (1946). But see
Thompson v. City of Carrollton, 211 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Connor v. City of
University Park, 142 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). See generally Babcock, Classification
and Segregation Among Zoning Districts, 1954 U. ILL. L.F. 186, 203.
94. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 927 (1966).
95. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 67, at 1040.
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residents now enact zoning ordinances to limit or totally obstruct the
construction of additional apartment units in their suburban municipali-
ties.9 Having moved to the suburbs to avoid congested, high-rise city
living, and presently paying the commuting price to enjoy the single-
family suburban pattern, these residents are not anxious to see the
conditions that they paid so much to leave re-created in their new sur-
roundings.17 Communities challenged on this policy have been able to
produce respectable authority bolstering their position. The Supreme
Court in the Euclid decision addressed itself specifically to the subject
of apartments, 8 advancing the notion that an apartment building was
an undesirable neighbor, similar in nature to a parasitic nuisance. This
idea has tended to persist in the suburbs despite able efforts to undercut
the assumption factually." Even after its vivid and unflattering charac-
terization of apartments, the Court in Euclid did recognize that consti-
tutional questions surround the practice of setting up a residential zone
from which apartment houses are excluded. Despite the acknowledged
doubt, however, it did uphold such districting. Most courts have fol-
lowed this precedent, generally without logical expansion or new investi-
gation of the matter.'0 Recent decisions suggest little judicial inclination
to reverse the long-held position that apartment exclusion is a legitimate
exercise of the zoning power. 0 1 Nonetheless, if one may judge from the
number and nature of recent lawsuits, momentum is building to link this
"settled" policy of apartment exclusion with unacceptable consequences
of racial and economic segregation, and thus with urban decline. 02 Since
multifamily units must be built somewhere in an urban society, and
since the right of a municipality to exclude them has been upheld liber-
ally by the courts, municipal activity concerning apartments has become
something of a competition. The older or more aware municipalities
move rapidly to develop a master plan with which to defend their exclu-
sion of apartments, while the tardier or newer local governmental unit
is left to cope with the problem of higher density housing. The problem
96. Babcock and Bosselman detail the methods employed by the suburbs to achieve mini-
mum multifamily housing growth and suggest both open and furtive motives for this community
response. Id.
97. NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1970, at 57; id. Nov. 15, 1971, at 63.
98. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
99. See Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 67, at 1062-65.
100. E.g., Trendel v. County of Cook, 27 I11. 2d 155, 188 N.E.2d 668 (1963).
101. E.g., Westling v. City of St. Louis Park, 284 Minn. 351, 170 N.W.2d 218 (1969).
102. E.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.




has compounded as courts consistently have deferred to legislative bod-
ies on these matters. Since the legislature is subject to the electorate,
and since the electorate does not include those trying to enter the munic-
ipality for the purpose of living there in multifamily housing, those
interested in change have little real leverage on the source of power.
10 3
Nor can the developer or landowner desiring to construct apartments
operate easily in the face of significant opposition by residents to the
introduction of multifamily housing.
Studies indicate that the dilemma may be especially acute in the
decade of the 1970's. Available evidence demonstrates that households
headed by 30-34 year olds typically seek a one-family house for the first
time, while persons under this age tend to live in apartments. During
the 1960's, however, the production of one-family households declined
because of the low birthrate in the Depression years and the consequent
lack of single-family housing demand 30 years later. This factor and the
higher birthrate of the Second World War years combined to produce
a higher ratio of multifamily housing demand to single-family housing
demand in the 1960's than in the 1950's. This disparity may become
even more apparent as the 30-34 age group begins to grow again, at the
same time that its traditional demand for single-family units cannot be
satisfied because of stringent large lot zoning, minimum cost, and floor
area requirements. 14 Complicating matters further will be the parallel
competition for available suburban apartment housing from older peo-
ple, up to and beyond retirement age, who are moving to the suburbs
at a significantly expanding rate.
IV. THEORIES OF ATTACK
The clash of the economic and social pressures militating for the
migration of low-income blacks and whites to the more affluent suburbs
with the seemingly immovable political, economic, and legal barriers
erected to maintain the stability of suburban areas, has given rise to a
wide-ranging series of recent developments. Probably the two most sig-
nificant occurrences thus far are the decision of the Supreme Court in
James v. Valtierra'5 and the recent policy statement of the President
of the United States concerning the economic and racial integration of
suburban areas.06 That the President felt constrained to issue such a
103. See generally Note, supra note 33, at 341.
104. Regional Plan News, No. 91, Sept. 1969, at 4-7.
105. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
106. Statement by President Richard M. Nixon on federal policies on equal housing oppor-
tunity, supra note 8.
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policy statement attests to the intense pressure and the acute political
sensitivity generated by the clash of the forces described.
The United States Civil Rights Commission, the Suburban Action
Institute, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the National Urban Coalition, and other groups are attacking
through public pronouncements, litigation, and other means the alleged
failures of government at all levels, including the national, to move
forcefully against extant exclusionary legal restrictions on the move-
ment of the poor and the black to suburban areas.'0 7 Suburban rejection
of the poor and the black can hardly be denied; it is equally clear that
local land use policies have been the suburb's major means of closing
out the poor. This section will discuss the litigation and legislation that
have developed primarily from efforts to move low-income housing into
more affluent residential suburban areas; it will also discuss other devel-
opments that have had, or are likely to have, an effect upon the outcome
of the struggle with which this paper deals.
A. The Brief for the Excluded
It is clear that racial minorities and the economically disadvan-
taged have a constitutionally derived interest in freely choosing where
they will live.1"8 It is also clear, however, that this interest is not pro-
tected absolutely against any and all state action"' 9-only action that
discriminates arbitrarily, capriciously, or invidiously. For example, per-
sons may not be fenced out of a particular residential area, city, or
county because of their race; 10 no more may they be fenced out because
107. See, e.g., Arnold,.Decision Nears on Whether to Force People to Integrate in Suburbia,
National Observer, Feb. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 4; Barker, Open Housing: No Southern State Has
Moved to Enforce the Law of the Land, SOUTH TODAY, March 1971, at 4; Davidoff & Davidoff,
Opening the Suburbs: Towards Exclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 509 (1971);
Karmin, Nixon on Housing: Caution Is the Word, What Does He Expect From the Suburbs?, Wall
Street J., Jan. 19, 1971, at 16, col. 3; Morris, Suburbia, Civil Rights, Next Battleground, NAACP
HOUSING BULLETIN (July, 1969).
108. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Supreme Court has stated: "[A]
careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth
or race . . . two factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect and
thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny." McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802, 807 (1969). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Cf Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
affd sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
109. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d
321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970).
110. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d
1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
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of low income."' This section will review briefly some of the arguments
that have been or may be advanced as a basis for attack against land
use tactics that result in such an exclusion of the poor. 2
By analogy to the school desegregation cases, it is arguable that
separate neighborhoods are even less equal than separate schools. This
is so because separate neighborhoods deprive minority groups of not
only equal educational opportunity but also equal access to jobs."' The
emigration of industry to suburban areas and the sudden popularity of
peripheral areas as sites for corporate headquarters and other profes-
sional and business offices have exacerbated this situation."' The na-
tion's infatuation with the automobile and the resulting expenditure of
a major portion of national resources on highways has left compara-
tively minuscule amounts for mass transit."5 Hence, the inner city
dweller finds that not only is it financially impossible for him to live near
the work available in the suburbs, but also he is unable to transport
himself economically to his new location of employment.",
It therefore is argued persuasively that territorial discrimination
against the less affluent-who are frequently members of racial minori-
ties"'-cannot stand unless some rational basis in local conditions can
I 1. Cf Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). On the question of whether there is
"an economic right" to a house in suburbia see Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic
Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell for Home Rule?, I TOLEDO L. REV. 297, 312-16 (1969).
112. In this connection see Bass, Exclusionary Zoning; Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3
URBAN LAWYER 344 (1971); Schwartz, Exclusionary Zoning-Suggested Constitutional Attacks,
4 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 345 (1970); Comment, A Survey of the JudicialResponses to Exclusionary
Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 537 (1971).
113. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, THE IMPACT OF
HOUSING PA17ERNS ON JOB OPPORTUNITIES (1968).
114. See Greenhouse, Rise in Jobs Poses Problem in Suburbs, N.Y. Times, August 18, 1971,
at I, col. I (city ed.).
115. See Shipler, supra note 2.
116. Id.
117. A recent finding by the President of the United States has brought this situation into
focus. "Community opposition to low- and moderate-income housing involves both racial and
economic discrimination. Under the Open Housing Act of 1968, it is now illegal to discriminate
in the sale or rental of most housing on the basis of race. Strict enforcement of this and similar
statutes will help establish an atmosphere in which such discrimination will be the exception rather
than the rule. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it is difficult, if not impossible, in many communi-
ties to find sites for low- and moderate-income housing because the occupants will be poor, or will
be members of a racial minority, or both. The consequence is that either no low- or moderate-
income housing is built or that it is built only in the inner city, thus heightening the tendency for
racial polarity in our society." PRESIDENT'S SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL HOUSING
GOALS, H.R. Doc. No. 292, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970). Also the National Commission on
Urban Problems has observed: "The number of persons of Anglo-Saxon and European stock in
the public housing projects, therefore, probably does not exceed two-fifths and might be as low as
one-third if the figures were brought up to 1968. While these racial stocks form about half of the
elderly, they comprise less than a third of the children. This is merely a quantitative appraisal of
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be offered to justify the discrimination."' Destruction of the environ-
ment, overcrowding of schools, loss of tax base, and intolerable pressure
upon municipal services are advanced frequently to provide rational
bases for the exclusion. Ultimately, the weighing of these factors against
the interests of racial and economic minorities in enjoying the fruits of
our society should be the constitutional determinant. It is highly un-
likely that the courts will recognize an ostensibly valid community inter-
est that is in fact asserted only to provide support for racial prejudice
and opposition to desegregation.
B. Constitutional Attacks
1. The Right to Travel.-That the right to migrate freely
throughout the country in search of new opportunities is a basic civil
right is no longer open to dispute.' Freedom from arbitrary govern-
mental restriction of the right to travel if and where one chooses within
the country, although not expressly declared in the Constitution, has
long been implicit in our form of government, and has been recognized
by the courts: "For all the great purposes for which the Federal govern-
ment was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We
are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part
of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States."'," The cases
buttressing this argument deal with the arbitrary exclusion of a class of
persons from a state and state efforts to deter or penalize those who wish
to enter its borders.'12 It is not an altogether implausible argument,
however, that exclusionary land use practices, either condoned or offi-
cially enforced by the state, fall within the proscription of the relevant
cases when their effect is to restrict or destroy the "right to migrate and
settle." This argument applies even when the movement is intrastate, if
the onus of the restrictions falls on certain disfavored racial and eco-
nomic groups. 22 Moreover, even if the constitutional right to travel
the actual facts without the slightest degree of judgment on the relative quality of the occupants.
It does help, however, to explain some popular opposition to public housing. NATIONAL COMM'N
ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 114 (1969).
118. See Schwartz, supra note 112, at 346. See also Cutler, Legality of Zoning To Exclude
the Poor: A Preliminary Analysis of Evolving Law, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 483 (1971).
119. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941); Brenner, The Right to Travel-Even to Suburbia, [1968-71 Transfer Binder] CCH
POVERTY L. REP. 1 11,013 (undated). See also Note, The Right to Travel. Another Constitutional
Standard for Local Land Use Regulations, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 612 (1972).
120. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (1 How.) 282, 492 (1849).
121. See note 119 supra.
122. Cf Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevel-
opment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Western Addition Community Organization v.
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applies only to interstate movement, land use restrictions that work to
the disadvantage of the poor or black can prevent the immigration of
those groups as effectively as more blatant prohibitions.
2. Substantive Due Process.-Even Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.123 leaves an area of impermissible governmental interven-
tion: "It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases
where the general public interst would so far outweigh the interest of
the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in
the way.' '12  Hence, although the courts will defer to legislative exper-
tise, unless it is shown that the regulation is "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare,"' 2' at some point the interest of persons other
than local residents and landowners must be considered.2 6 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has recently found that exclusionary municipal
ordinances which limit new housing to single-family homes on large lots
do conflict with the general public interest:
We . . . refuse to allow the township to do precisely what we have never permit-
ted-keep out people, rather than make community improvements ....
[Clommunities must deal with the problems of population growth. They may not
refuse to confront the future by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict
population to near present levels. It is not for any given township to say who may
or may not live within its confines, while disregarding the interests of the entire
area. If Concord Township is successful in unnaturally limiting its population
growth through the use of exclusive zoning regulations, the people who would
normally live there will inevitably have to live in another community, and the
requirement that they do so is not a decision that Concord Township should alone
be able to make."'2
Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Note, The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation
and an Approach to Full Indemnity, 21 STAN. L. REv. 801 (1969).
123. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
124. Id. at 390.
125. Id. at 395. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Zahn v. Board of
Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927). See also C. EDSON & B. LANE, supra note 7, at § 9:7.
126. Several cases have accorded standing to residents of neighboring municipalities in
zoning litigation. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955);
Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 1 I11. 2d 28, 115 N.E.2d 315 (1953); Borough of Cresskill v.
Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). See also Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and
Economic Exclusionary Zoning: the Beginning of the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANNUAL 9, 47-54;
Note, supra note 33; Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local Zoning Decisions:
Restricted Access to State Courts and the Alternative Federal Forum, 22 SYRAcusE L. REV. 598
(1971).
127. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 474-75, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (1970).
See also Fletcher v. Romney, 323 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); G & D Holland Constr. Co. v.
City of Marysville, 12 Cal. App. 3d 989, 91 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Cal. App. 1970); Baskerville v. Town
of Montclair, Docket No. L-25287-68 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct., March 30, 1970); Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
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3. Equal Protection.-The due process clause is helpful only if the
court is willing to consider the interests of those excluded from local
community housing. Since many courts have refused to look beyond the
landowners and community involved, 28 the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment immediately becomes an attractive alterna-
tive weapon to counteract exclusionary land use practices and regula-
tions.12 For example, if it were shown that exclusionary zoning practices
were designed to keep out blacks the constitutional precedents dealing
with such disfavored racial discrimination could be utilized effectively
to strike down the exclusionary practice.2 0 It would be a foolish subur-
ban community, however, that would enact or enforce such a racially
discriminatory zoning ordinance.'3' This does not mean that the equal
protection clause is available only in the unlikely event that a com-
munity has engaged in such overt racial discrimination. The Supreme
Court has held that discrimination against the poor requires a searching
review by the courts.3 2 Indeed, the Court has stated: "[A] careful
examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn
on the basis of wealth or race, . . . two factors which would indepen-
dently render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more
exacting judicial scrutiny." '
When an exclusionary zoning device is shown to have been enacted
by a legislative body with a clearly discriminatory motive, the equal
protection clause provides a very effective means of attack. 34 It is
probable, however, that in the original enactment of most zoning ordi-
nances discrimination against racial and economic minorities was not
intended, but has been only an incidental effect. The discriminatory
motive attack therefore is most helpful in those instances when the
128. See Note, supra note 33, at 350-60. But see Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black
Jack, No. 72-1006 (8th Cir., Sept. 25, 1972).
129. As Edson and Lane have put it, "the [equal protection] argument can be utilized to
challenge either the motivation of the municipality's action or its effect." C. EDSON & B. LANE,
supra note 7, at § 9:9; Sager, supra note 35. Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84
HARV. L. REv. 1645 (1971).
130. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been utilized to strike
down discriminatory state legislation or state legislation discriminatorily enforced on the basis of
race. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
131. But see Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
132. See note 108 supra.
133. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969): Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425
F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
134. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970); Dailey
v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
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municipal legislative body has subsequently rezoned property to prevent
its use for low-income or subsidized housing or has refused to rezone
property to make possible such land use even though rezoning ordi-
nances are customarily enacted in factual contexts that do not involve
entrance of low-income groups. In some cases, the response of the citi-
zens of the community may evidence discriminatory intent; if the munic-
ipality succumbs to this citizen pressure, official action aiding private
prejudice may establish a cause of action.'35
In more cases than not, however, the zoning ordinance at issue is
neutral, disclosing no clear intent to discriminate. In the long run, these
"neutral" zoning ordinances will be more of a deterrent to out-
migration of the poor and blacks to the suburbs than the intentionally
discriminatory zoning ordinances. Since legislation that acts unfavora-
bly upon racial minorities and economically disadvantaged groups is
subject to the most severe scrutiny by the Supreme Court, one might
assume that the policy factors alleged to be supporting the exclusionary
zoning practices would need considerable support in fact to overcome
the restrictive and discriminatory effect upon the excluded classes.'36
The recent case of James v. Valtierra,17 however, casts considerable
doubt upon the ability of the excluded to demonstrate the invalidity of
the policy factors supporting exclusionary land use practices. 13
4. The Supremacy Clause.-The insufficient supply of decent
housing has been one of the most intractable social problems that the
United States has faced in recent years. It was discovered early that the
housing problem is not manageable at the state or local level; the infu-
sion of quantities of money available only at the federal level coupled
with nationwide planning and supervision is necessary. Even so, the
results of the national effort have been spotty.3 9 Furthermore, if these
135. See text accompanying notes 163-65 infra.
136. See Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291
(9th Cir. 1970); cf Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
137. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
138. See text accompanying notes 147-52 infra.
139. The Kerner Commission warned us that "white society is deeply implicated in the
ghetto. White institutions :reated it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it."
The Commission makes it clear that it believes the low-income housing program has been one of
these institutions. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 2
(1968). "Most of the projects have been built in inner city areas. Thus, at a time when increasing
numbers of job opportunities are in the suburbs, the poor find that the only housing they can afford,
be it public or private, generally is located in the inner-city." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS 132 (1969). See also A. SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL
INSECURITY 110-11 (1963): "If public housing is the vessel, perhaps Congress is the vintner, but
one must ask about the grape and the palate of the taster. The recipe for populating a city of which
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efforts to provide decent shelter for disadvantaged citizens are thwarted
by exclusionary land use practices condoned and abetted by local au-
thorities, the likelihood of a successful integrated national housing pro-
gram becomes almost nonexistent. Hence, an argument can be, and has
been, made that article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution,
which provides that the "Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land," takes precedence over local exclusionary zoning ordi-
nances and practices when they defeat or limit the effectiveness of fed-
eral housing programs. "'
Examination of legislation dealing with housing over a long period
of time reveals that it has been the policy of the federal government to
make available "shelter free from any racial discrimination fostered by
federal, state or local governments."'' Also, title VIII, section 801, of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968, declared that "it is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States.'14 This goes beyond previous statutes in
that it prohibits discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or
national origin in most private real estate transactions, whether or not
federal assistance is involved. Moreover, the 1968 Act makes it the
responsibility of all executive departments and agencies, and the specific
responsibility of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, to
administer programs and activities relating to housing and urban devel-
we have spoken, concentrates Negroes in public housing as in slums. Segregation is not entirely
new, of course, but since 1954 it has become a more open insult. To the extent that public housing
founded the sites chiefly in land cleared for renewal, large areas were devoted exclusively to public
housing (St. Louis is an example). To the extent that the growing suburbs successfully resisted
public housing, they confined it to the city core. Meanwhile as between 1935 and 1960, there was
a great proportion of Americans who had never experienced priority personally or were trying to
forget it. They contributed to a more critical, if not pious, public view of public housing. Thus, a
conjunction of social and economic trends leads to the setting apart of families in public housing."
140. E.g., Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321
(6th Cir. 1969). See also Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
141. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 (1970); United States Housing Act of 1937, §§ 1 et seq.,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970);
Fair Housing Act of 1968, §§ 801 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970); Demonstration Cities
and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, §§ 101 etseq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301 etseq. (1970); DEP'T
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Low RENT HOUSING MANUAL § 205.1(g) (1965).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). For an excellent discussion of the federal role in eliminating
racial discrimination in housing see Statement by President Richard M. Nixon on federal policies
on equal housing opportunity, supra note 8. Subsequent to President Nixon's statement, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development issued new regulations setting forth project
selection criteria for public and publicly supported housing programs. 37 Fed. Reg. 75 (1972); 37
Fed. Reg. 205 (1972). The 8 criteria emphasized are "need for low-income housing," "minority
housing opportunities," "improved location for low-income families," "relationship to orderly
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opment in an affirmative manner to further the purpose of this title.'
Ranjel v. City of Lansing' and Shannon v. United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development' represent recent cases in
which the supremacy clause argument has been essentially accepted, but
this theory of attack has severe limitations. As suburban resistance to
low-income housing stiffens, and as suburban political clout grows, ex-
pressions of federal policy that contravene the exclusionary land use
policies of suburban areas undoubtedly will become considerably
muted.' The clear federal policy may therefore be much more difficult
for the courts to locate and identify.
C. Recent Developments
I. The Referendum Cases.-The Supreme Court in James v.
Valtierra"4 I has provided answers to many of the questions raised in this
Article, but it leaves unanswered even more questions."' The case in-
volved attempts by citizens of the city of San Jose and the county of
San Mateo in California to overcome the effect of referenda conducted
under article 34 of the California Constitution that had precluded the
location of low-cost housing in certain local neighborhoods. A three-
judge court, relying upon Hunter v. Erickson,' in which the Supreme
Court had invalidated an Akron, Ohio charter provision requiring a
referendum before antidiscrimination legislation could be enacted,
struck down the referendum article.' The three-judge court in Valtierra
held that the challenged article placed a special burden without rational
basis on the poorer members of ethnic minorities, and thus violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The Supreme
growth and development," "relationship of proposed project to physical environment," "ability to
perform," "project potential for creating minority employment and business opportunities," and
"provision for sound housing management." 37 Fed. Reg. 205 (1972).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1970).
144. 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970).
145. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
146. For an excellent discussion of the new independence of the so-called "outer cities" see
Rosenthal, Suburbs Shed City Dominance, N.Y. Times, August 16, 1971, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.). It
has been suggested that the political impact which the poor and black can bring to bear is compara-
tively small in the face of the burgeoning political influence of the suburbs. Delaney, The Outer
City.: Negroes Find Few Tangible Gains, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1971, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
147. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
148. There has been an abundance of writing about James v. Valtierra, but by far the most
perceptive and thorough is Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Su-
preme Court. 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1384 (1971). See Note, James v. Valtierra: Housing Discrimina-
tion by Referendum? 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 115 (1971).
149. 393 U.S. 385.
150. Valtierra v. Housing Authority, 313 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970).
151. Id. at 5.
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Court disagreed, however, noting that California had traditionally uti-
lized the initiative and referendum device; the Court emphasized that
"of course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular
group does not always deny equal protection." Perhaps the most signifi-
cant portion of the decision is the following paragraph:
The people of California have also decided by their own vote to require referendum
approval of low-rent public housing projects. This procedure ensures that all the
people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to large
expenditures of local government funds for increased public services and to lower
tax revenues. It gives them a voice in decisions that will affect the future develop-
ment of their own community. This procedure for democratic decision making does
not violate the constitutional command that no State shall deny to any person 'the
equal protection of the laws."-"
In earlier cases, now of diminished significance in light of James
v. Valtierra, the Sixth Circuit held in Ranjel v. City of Lansing5 3 that
a reversal by referendum of a spot zoning ordinance for low-income
housing did not violate the equal protection clause; the court also held
that there was no federal law that overrode the Michigan referendum
provisions under the supremacy clause. 54 The Ninth Circuit also held,
in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 5
that a California article 34 referendum designed to reverse the rezoning
of an area to a multifamily residential category would not be enjoined.
The court in Southern Alameda determined that there could be many
reasons, including social and environmental values, for the people to
decide by referendum to invalidate the rezoning. Significantly, James v.
Valtierra echoes this reasoning.
Although the ultimate impact of these referendum cases culminat-
ing in James v. Valtierra is by no means certain, they do provide a
reasonable basis for some predictions about the Supreme Court's proba-
ble response to exclusionary zoning issues. Those who believe that eco-
nomic discrimination is inextricably bound up with racial discrimination
are pessimistic about the possibility of successful attack on exclusionary
land use practices, at least when they are hedged about with initiative
and referendum protections under state law.'56 Actually, as we have
seen, Valtierra is consistent with prior cases that have refused to enjoin
152. 402 U.S. at 142-43.
153. 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
154. Id. at 322-23.
155. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
156. Cf Lefcoe, supra note 148, at 1386. Richard F. Bellman of the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing has said that "the ruling appears to have immunized all
exclusionary zoning and land-use practices from 14th Amendment attack except in those cases in
which a clear racially discriminatory purpose can be established .... quoted in Herbers, Three
Strikes Against Poor and Black, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1971, § 4, at 5, col. 5 (city ed.).
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referenda directed at the possible repeal of zoning variances that permit-
ted low-income housing construction. 157 Additionally, as President
Nixon has recently pointed out, "the term[s] 'poor' and 'black' are not
interchangeable."'5 8 The Supreme Court in Valtierra has recognized this
distinction and found that there are legitimate objections to the willy-
nilly "economic integration" of suburban areas.'59 Nevertheless, the
post-Valtierra enactment of referendum requirements similar to Cali-
fornia's is likely to encounter difficulty in the Supreme Court.' This is
particularly so when there is no tradition, as in California, of utilizing
the initiative and referendum devices or when an unenthusiastic electo-
rate is empowered to ban low-income projects that, unlike the Valtierra
projects, could support themselves by property taxes.' It is clear, how-
ever, that courts faced with the conflict described in this Article will be
required to analyze more thoroughly the basis for the allegedly discrimi-
natory exclusion, and the equation of economic disadvantage with racial
discrimination no longer will be accepted so readily.1
2
2. Rezoning Cases.-Upon a showing that a refusal to rezone or
a rezoning that forestalls a low- or moderate-income housing project is
for the specific purpose of discrimination, the courts have been quick
to act on behalf of the excluded group under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. While it may be somewhat more difficult
after Valtierra to find discriminatory purposes merely because of an
incidental effect, there is every reason to believe that the courts will
continue to be vigilant against discriminatory schemes. Two recent cases
will suffice to demonstrate the factual genre and the judicial response.
In Dailey v. City of Lawton,13 Columbia Square, Inc. proposed
to construct a privately sponsored low-income housing project in a pre-
157. See, e.g., Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
158. Statement by President Richard M. Nixon on federal policies on equal housing oppor-
tunity, supra note 8.
159. Among the objections were "physical aspects" (the community complained of the
"institutional" quality and "mammoth" proportions of public housing), sociological impact (public
housing is in a class by itself because it is controversial, tends to induce community anxieties, and
is thought by many to have an adverse impact on environment), and "financial aspects," including
loss of tax space, crowding of schools and other public services. For an analysis of some of the
evidence on this question see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. RaV. 3, 124 & n.13
(1971). See also Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 343 (1971).
160. Lefcoe, supra note 148, at 1390.
161. But cf. Aloi & Goldberg, Notes for a Revised Article: Exclusionary Zoning: Recent
Developments and Approaches to Litigation, in ZONING AND LAND USE 343, 349-50 (Practising
Law Institute No. 54, 1972).
162. For a post- Valtierra treatment of the problem see English v. Town of Huntington, 448
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1971).
163. 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
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dominantly white residential section of Lawton, Oklahoma. The City of
Lawton refused to issue a building permit without a zone change and a
request for the necessary change was denied. The property was owned
by the Catholic bishop, who acquired it from the city in 1962. The city
had operated a school on the premises and the Diocese continued to
operate a school until 1966. In 1964, a new zoning ordinance was passed
and the property was classified as PF, an abbreviation for "public facili-
ties," even though at that time the land was owned by the church and
not by any public agency. Most of the area around the block contained
single dwellings, some of which rented rooms.
Efforts to rezone the property were opposed vigorously before the
Lawton Metropolitan Area Planning Commission and before the Law-
ton City Council. Some 250 signatures of white residents were obtained
on a petition that was circulated to oppose the change. Several factors
pointed toward racial discrimination as the reason for the refusal to
rezone: the area immediately surrounding the block in question was
already zoned R-4 for higher density residential buildings; the City of
Lawton was in large measure a racially segregated city, with the excep-
tion of the military personnel at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; the excluded
housing project was designed to serve low-income groups consisting of
Negroes, Spanish-Americans, and poor whites; the signers of the peti-
tion in opposition were all white; the racial situation was discussed in
connection with the circulation of the petitions; and finally, the one
dissenting member of the Planning Commission testified that opposition
to the project was based on racial bias. The Tenth Circuit rejected the
argument of the Lawton city officials that the project was opposed
because it would overcrowd the neighborhood, the local schools, the
recreational facilities, and the local fire fighting capabilities. The court
pointed out that there was little proof of the problems alleged, and
furthermore, the classification of the area immediately surrounding the
block in question as high density residential demonstrated that the prob-
lems described would not be increased seriously by the proposed rezon-
ing.
The result in Dailey is supported by an even more recent decision
in the Second Circuit. Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of
Lackawanna164 involved an effort by the city of Lackawanna to surround
a housing site for low- and moderate-income blacks in a previously
white section of the city with an open space and park area; the city also
164. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). For an excellent
discussion of this case and its utility see Freilich & Bass, Exclusionary Zoning: Suggested Litiga-
tion Approaches, 3 URBAN LAWYER 344, 351-54 (1971).
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wished to impose a moratorium on all new subdivisions on the ground
that the city's sewage system was inadequate. The complaint alleged
that a property owner had committed itself to sell 30 acres of vacant
land to Kennedy Park Homes Association, a nonprofit corporation
formed by the Colored People's Civic and Political Organization to
develop a low-income housing subdivision, but that in October, 1968,
the city's zoning ordinances were amended to restrict the use of this land
to a park and recreation area and to declare a moratorium prohibiting
approval of all future subdivisions. Plaintiffs argued that these measures
were passed for the purpose of denying low-income families equal pro-
tection of the law in obtaining decent housing, and therefore sought a
judgment declaring that defendants' use of zoning and appropriation
powers was an unconstitutional deprivation of their rights. Mandatory
relief requiring defendants to approve the proposed subdivision was
sought.
The court rejected defendants' arguments that the city needed a
park, that construction of the subdivision would permanently foreclose
the city from having such a park, and that the available sewers in the
proposed subdivision could not tolerate the additional sewerage of a new
subdivision. The court stated its conclusion succinctly: "Discrimination
guided the actions of the City." The reasons given for the passage of
the rezoning ordinance were found to be mere rationalizations and wil-
ful contrivances. The court relied heavily upon the fact that of the three
wards of the city, the one at issue had only a 0.2 percent white popula-
tion, and had "the oldest, most dilapidated .. houses, and the highest
residential density with the greatest percentage of persons per unit in the
city." The court declared that some discrimination resulted from
"thoughtlessness" or failure on the part of city officials to consider or
plan for the housing needs of all Lackawanna residents, and that defen-
dants might not escape responsibility by ignoring community needs or
by failing to consider alternative solutions to the city-wide problems.
165
D. Legislative Attack by Regional Planning
One of the peculiarities of zoning is that it is basically selfish.'66
Until recent years, very little consideration has been given to city-wide
or regional planning; in particular, individuals outside the particular
area affected simply have been nonpersons in the eyes of the municipal
bodies that enact zoning ordinances." 7 This antiquarian approach is
165. 436 F.2d at 114.
166. See generally D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA (1971).
167. The lack of American regional planning is in stark contrast to the English experience,
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unrealistic because the interests of sections of a city or metropolitan
area are inextricably bound one to the other and therefore simply cannot
be islands unto themselves. Additionally, this insular philosophy, if ac-
cepted by the courts, can present severe difficulties for plaintiffs who
wish to move into areas from which they are, as a practical matter,
excluded by restrictive land use practices. There is a growing awareness
that such parochialism in planning will not work in the kind of urban
society that we are developing. 168 Given the Balkanization of metropoli-
tan areas and the "every man for himself" syndrome that seems to
afflict the suburbs, the beginnings of a move toward state and regional
planning are heartening indeed.
Recognition that local domination of land use planning is very
nearly over is reflected in the enactment of new state-wide land use
planning statutes. 6 By no means does all of the legislation specifically
deal with the exclusion of racial and economic minorities from suburban
areas, the topics of this Article, but inevitably any state-level plan that
impinges upon local control of land use will deal with the problem of
relocating these now-excluded groups.
There is very little uniformity in the legislation that has been
adopted so far; however, the American Law Institute is in the process
of making available to the states a model land development code 7' that
very well may develop into a popular pattern in the future. Tentative
Draft No. 3 of the Model Land Development Code has been published
and the methodology of its approach can be sketched briefly.
The ALI proposal recognizes "that at least 90% of the land use
decisions currently being made by local governments have no major
effect on the state or national interest," and that "[flurthermore, most
of these decisions can be made intelligently only by people familiar with
the local social, environmental and economic conditions. '"', On the
other hand, the proposal recognizes that land use planning decisions of
important state or regional interest need to be controlled at the state or
regional level.
where the Town and Country Planning Act, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51 (1947), provides for equal
regional and even national land use planning "to assure the assignment of land to the best possible
use for the nation as a whole ... " C. HAAR, LAND PLANNING LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 5 (1951).
168. See Greenhouse, The Outer City: Growth Crying Out for Guidance, N.Y. Times, June
3, 1971, at 1, col. I (city ed.).
169. See Conti, With Little Fanfare, States Are Broadening Control Over Land Use, Wall
Street, J., June 28, 1972, at 1, col. 6 (S.W. ed.). See aalso Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: A
Legislative Approach, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583 (1971). For an argument in favor of politicizing
the planning process see Davidoff, Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, 31 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS
331 (1965).
170. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971).
171. Id. at 5.
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Under the ALI proposal the local government's land development
agency remains the primary regulatory body. The state legislature and
the state land planning agency created by the Code determine policies
that will be administered by local land development agencies in conjunc-
tion with local policies. A state land adjudicatory board is created to
provide an appellate tribunal for review of agency decisions.172
The supervening power of the state land planning agency comes
into play in situations that involve three different categories of land use.
The first occurs when a determination has been made that a "District
of Critical State Concern" exists. A "District of Critical State Con-
cern" is defined as:
(a) [A]n area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect upon, an
existing or proposed major public facility or other area of major public investment;
(b) [A]n area containing or having a significant impact upon historical, natural
or environmental resources of regional or statewide importance; or
(c) [A] proposed site of a new community designated in a State Land Develop-
ment Plan, together with a reasonable amount of surrounding land."
3
The second category of land use that requires the approval and
supervision of the state land planning agency is the "Development of
State or Regional Benefit."' 74 Uses having state or regional benefit
include airports, public utility transmission lines, major highways and
similar large developments. Finally, there are types of developments
that may have only local impact if undertaken on a small scale but have
state or regional significance when undertaken on a large scale. They
are called "Large Scale Developments.' 75
The comments to section 7-301 of the Model Land Development
Code make it clear that the construction of low- and moderate-income
housing, even in areas where it is not wanted, is a development of state
or regional benefit that needs state supervision and direction in order
to serve the needs of the larger community.' For example, the com-
ments state that "[i]t is important to insure that the local governments
do not allow their own constituents' fears of the adverse effects of
development to outweigh completely the interests of a broader section
of society that might be entitled to greater concern.' 77 Again, the
draftsmen of the Model Land Development Code state:
Local governments often believe that the heavily subsidized programs have an
unfavorable cost-revenue impact, and there may be social and racial prejudice
172. Id. at 6.
173. Id. § 7-201(3).
174. Id. § 7-301.
175. Id. § 7-401.
176. Id. § 7-301, comment at 25.
177. Id. at 23.
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against the anticipated occupants. Thus it has been difficult to find sites for housing
of this type that will be approved by local governments. [Section 7-301] would
permit the State Land Planning Agency to designate decisions involving subsidized
housing as appealable to the State Land Adjudicatory Board. This is consistent
with the recommendations of all of the commissions and task forces that have
recently studied this problem."'
Massachusetts 71 and New York' already have legislation that
purports to provide for state-level overriding of local exclusionary zon-
ing practices. The Urban Development Corporation (UDC) of New
York may override local zoning and subdivision laws when they conflict
with UDC findings that a particular site is appropriate for low- or
moderate-cost housing. Apparently this power has not been widely used
by the Urban Development Corporation, and a rather congenial rela-
tionship exists with local agencies.1
81
The Massachusetts "Anti-Snob Zoning" law, enacted in 1969, pro-
vides that at least 0.3 percent of the vacant residential land of a com-
munity-or ten acres, whichever is larger-must be made available for
development each year for a period of five years upon application for
zoning changes by eligible nonprofit or limited profit housing spon-
sors. 2 Refusal by local jurisdictions to permit nonprofit or limited
profit sponsors to proceed with development plans is subject to review
by a special state zoning board of appeals.8 3 As in the case of the
Urban Development Corporation in New York, the state commission
may override local authorities when it finds that a local jurisdiction has
failed to make land available under the law.8 4 The usefulness of this
statute appears to be somewhat limited, since it acts upon such a small
fraction of the available land and since there appears to be developing
the same congenial relationship between the state agency and the local
jurisdictions that exists in New York.
Several states, including Hawaii,' 8' Vermont,8 6 Colorado,'87 and
Maine,' have enacted legislation to provide for some state-wide and
regional planning. These states are tourist meccas; they also are being
plagued by developments designed to appeal to nonresidents who want
178. Id. at 25.
179. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1971).
180. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6254 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
181. See C. EDSON & B. LANE, supra note 7, at § 9:13.
182. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20 (Supp. 1971).
183. Id. § 21.
184. Id. § 23.
185. HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 205-1 to -15 (1968).
186. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001-91 (Supp. 1972).
187. COLORADO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-1-1 to -12, 106-2-1 to -34 (1963).
188. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681-85c (Supp. 1972).
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second homes in a pleasant climate. Environmental considerations seem
to weigh heavily in the minds of the legislators in these states, and there
is nothing specifically usable by racial and economic minorities seeking
to break into presently inaccessible suburbs."9
V. APPRAISAL
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney
has said of the resistance of white suburban homeowners to housing for
low-income blacks and others, "[T]his problem is as complex and sensi-
tive domestically as Vietnam is internationally, and I might add that it
has been burdened by the same lack of accurate reporting."'90 Unfortun-
ately, the intractability of the problem has been much more widely
recognized than has the frequently unfair and inaccurate reporting. Re-
fusal even to admit the existence of sound policy considerations oppos-
ing economic integration of suburbs has characterized the scholarly
articles in the area. This Article has outlined the interests of the ex-
cluded groups and the arguments that can be and have been made on
their behalf; this does not mean that the suburban landowner who wishes
to keep his neighborhood as it is has no legitimate countervailing inter-
ests. " ' Thus the dismay that greeted James v. Valtierra12 was largely
the result of a tunnel-vision approach to a grave social problem, for that
decision was in part a recognition of the legitimacy of the resisting
suburbs' arguments. It must be admitted, however, that many of the
pro-exclusionary zoning arguments have come to be a euphemistic ex-
pression of antipathy toward blacks and other racial minorities.9 3 To
189. It has been suggested that the easiest way to integrate the suburbs in more than a token
way would be to abandon zoning altogether, as is the case in Houston, Texas. See Siegan, Tear
Down the Fences?, BARRON'S, June 21, 1971, at 7, col. 1. See also 94 N.J.L.J. 129 (1971).
190. FORTUNE, Dec. 1970, at 100, 134.
191. For perceptive and balanced discussions of the problems that low- and moderate-
income housing can bring to a neighborhood see Bleiberg, Trampling the Grass Roots, BARRON'S,
Dec. 13, 1971, at 7, col. 1; Glazer, When the Melting Pot Doesn't Melt, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1972,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 12; Schleibla, Raze or Lower?, BARRON'S, Jan. 10, 1972, at 9, col. 1. The first
2 articles deal with the highly publicized federally supported project of the New York City Housing
Authority in Forest Hills, while the last article relates the Housing and Urban Development
problems with the huge Pruitt-Igoe high-rise project in St. Louis.
192. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
193. It must also be admitted that most suburban areas are now "parasites" with the inner
city as the "host." "Some functions are still left to the inner city. Rapid high-rise office develop-
ment in many cities testifies to one. White collar professionals-lawyers, brokers, bankers, govern-
ment workers-still require frequent face-to-face contact, a central verbal market place.
"Inner cities also remain cultural centers. But many suburban residents are willing to do
without downtown museums, theaters and symphonies, satisfying their cultural needs at outlying
universities or amateur performances.
"Most notably, the inner cities, despite the erosion of their economic strength, are still called
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the extent this is so, and to the extent it is condoned and aided by local
jurisdictions, there is every indication that the courts will respond with
appropriate remedies. These remedies, however, will not reach the
weighing of interests that constitutes the essence of the exclusionary
zoning problem; metropolitan, regional, state, and federal planning
must therefore strike a new balance between local and metropolitan
needs in the housing field. Of necessity, ultimate responsibility for the
supply of housing must be vested in an authority higher than the local
level. At the same time, the exercise of authority at the metropolitan
or higher level must reflect a creative search for solutions that satisfy
the need for housing without abrogating the right of local choice.,"
A. Socio-Economic Integration
In the twentieth century, American cities have been characterized
by residential stratification along socio-economic class lines."5 This is
in part a natural phenomenon, for, given the very human desire to secure
the best living conditions possible and assuming that the quality of these
conditions is a function of cost, it is inevitable in a society such as ours
that the well-to-do live better than the less affluent. Arguably, this socio-
economic segregation therefore is not a product of governmental eco-
nomic discrimination in land use practices, but is rather a logical inci-
dent of economic conditions and human behavior. Whether or not this
viewpoint has substantial validity, a careful analysis of the problems of
exclusionary zoning requires that it be examined. Thus, in the contro-
versy over the exclusion of lower income groups from suburbia, alto-
gether too little has been said about the "upward and outward" syn-
drome that has characterized the American people since at least the
on to perform a major social function: caring for the needy and societizing the poor." Rosenthal,
The Outer City: U.S. In Suburban Turmoil, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1971, § 1, at 28, col. 6 (city
ed.). See also Neenan, Suburban-Central City Exploitation Thesis: One City's Tale, 23 NAT'L TAX
J. 117 (1970).
194. An example of the ingenuity of approach that needs to be brought to bear upon this
problem is a recent experiment of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Kansas
City, where the federal government has taken 205 families, handed them rent money and told them
to find better housing of their own choice. So far, the project seems to be eminently successful.
See Bigart, U.S. HELPS POOR TO RENT OWN HOMES, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 5
(city ed.). For another example of careful planning and voluntary "local initiative" see Karmin,
Forced Integration? Not in Fairfax, Wall Street J., Sept. 29, 1971, at 10, col. 4 (S.W. ed.).
195. SOCIAL SCIENCE PANEL OF THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE DEP'T OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIVISION OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN
HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL SCIENCE
PANEL]. The footnotes to this study contain an excellent bibliography of the social science materials
dealing with the problem of this paper and can be used profitably for research by both the lawyer
and the the social scientist.
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middle of the nineteenth century. Ethnic and other groups, as the eco-
nomic opportunity has presented itself, have emigrated from the central
city to more desirable areas. Henry James, speaking through one of his
fictional characters, said in 1881: "At the end of three or four years we'll
move. That's the way to live in New York-to move every three or four
years. Then you always get the last thing. . . . So you see we'll always
have a new house . . . you get all the latest improvements."' 98 This
attitude toward upward mobility appears to be widely held today, and
is reflected by the loss of population in the inner city and the movement
away from the inner city of both retail and wholesale jobs."7 Although
one may condemn the inherent selfishness in such an attitude, or doubt
the desirability of the wanted move, no one has yet shown why this
phenomenon should not be a permissible incident of social and eco-
nomic success.
The arguments of those who deny any legitimacy to the socio-
economic stratification supported by exclusionary zoning seem to be
grounded upon the proposition that economically based residential sep-
aration represents the primary barrier to widespread social interaction
that would ultimately provide the solution for problems of racial dis-
crimination and unequal opportunity. In the context of exclusionary
practices, however, a recent study concluded that "[t]he net effect of
economic factors in explaining (racial) residential segregation is slight
... . Clearly, residential segregation is a more tenacious social prob-
lem than economic discrimination. Improving the economic status of
Negroes is unlikely by itself to alter prevailing patterns of racial residen-
tial segregation."' 8 Another recent study stated: "Black disadvantages
in educational attainment, in occupational achievement, and in income,
account for only a small amount of their observable segregation in
urban space. The web of discrimination is a principal factor underlying
racial segregation. The blacks have sharply limited options with respect
to housing choices."' 99 Moreover, the recent report of an Advisory Com-
mittee to the Department of Housing and Urban Development con-
cluded after an extensive study that "at present, the desirability of inter-
vention to foster socio-economic mixing in residential areas is uncer-
tain." 00 The study found that neighborhood heterogeneity does not nec-
essarily produce tolerance and a more democratic order. It also con-
196. H. JAMES, WASHINGTON SQUARE 36-37 (Harper & Bros. ed. 1922).
197. See notes 114 & 193 supra.
198. See C. Marrett, Social Stratification in Urban Areas, Dec. 1970, at 2 (panel paper
prepared for the Division of Behavioral Sciences, National Academy of Sciences).
199. SOCIAL SCIENCE PANEL, supra note 195 at 49.
200. Id. at 54.
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cluded that the evidence does not necessarily sustain the argument that
geographical proximity enhances social interaction among disparate
groups. Hence, it is questionable "whether housing and residential dis-
tribution is the most effective way to eliminate barriers to equal oppor-
tunity."20'
In addition to the questionable efficiency of socio-economic inte-
gration in achieving racial understanding, objective analysis compels
one to conclude that the suburban dweller may not be motivated by
racial antipathy or irrational fears when he opposes the location of
government-assisted low-income housing in his area. Some of his fears
may be unsupported in fact, but he feels that he is protecting both the
largest investment he will ever make-his home-and the environment
in which he is trying to rear his family. A certain amount of selfishness
can be excused, for in many instances low-income housing projects such
as Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis have destroyed the livability of the entire
surrounding neighborhood.2 ' It is difficult, however, to generate much
sympathy for the suburban dweller when he opts for zoning ordinances
compelling lot sizes from two to ten acres in size, or when he and fellow
citizens solicit business and industry for the neighborhood in order to
obtain tax relief, but simultaneously oppose the efforts of workers to live
near the place of their employment. His desire for suburban insularity
also rings hollow when he parasitically enjoys the educational, cultural,
and business advantages of the inner city without contributing anything
toward its support.20 3
The extent to which courts will be able to lend support to the
legitimate desires of the suburban dweller, when faced with constitu-
tional attacks upon exclusionary land practices, remains to be seen.
They should not, however, be summarily dismissed as mere evidence of
selfishness and bigotry.
B. A Brighter Outlook
The problem of the exclusion of racial and economic minorities
from the suburbs may, as events develop, be considerably more tracta-
ble than has been assumed. While industrial development has meant
huge tax advantages for some suburban communities, many neighbor-
ing areas are not blessed equally with shopping centers or industrial
parks, and stagger under huge tax burdens. If job opportunities are to
be created in suburban areas, with concomitant tax relief to landowners,
201. Id.
202. See note 191 supra.
203. See Vernon, The Changing Economic Function of the Central City, in URBAN RE-
NEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 3 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
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housing for the workers simply will have to be provided."0 ' Hence, al-
though the courts are very unlikely to hold zoning unconstitutional,
substantive due process and confiscation arguments are likely to be
more successful in the future when suburban areas are resisting multi-
family dwellings such as apartments and condominiums. In addition,
since the rapid appreciation of land values in the last decade has com-
pelled increased resort to multifamily dwellings and more efficient use
of land, the utilization of substantial areas for apartments and condomi-
niums will result in a "trickle-down" to less-advantaged groups. The
trickle-down is an empirically demonstrable phenomenon." 5
While there is no way to predict the eventual outcome, the spate
of decisions such as Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District26 and Serrano v. Priest,0 7 declaring that the financing of public
schools by local property taxes is unconstitutional because it discrimi-
nates against areas with poor tax bases, undoubtedly will make it much
more difficult for suburban areas to exclude racial and low-income
groups.208 The argument that the low-income housing projects do
not pay their way in property taxes will be unavailing if the state is
forced to adopt other methods of taxation to support the schools, and
perhaps other public services as well. 29 Neil Gold of the Suburban
Action Institute, an organization that has been highly active in opposing
suburban efforts to keep out lower-income people, considers Serrano's
likely effect on industrial location "in the long run, by all odds it's most
important" consequence.210 If the Serrano and Rodriguez principle is
204. Liberal mayors are reportedly feuding, however among themselves on the housing
issue; middle class blacks already residing in suburban areas are unenthusiastic about absorbing
large numbers of the poor. Thus, it seems that immediate change will come through judicial action.
See Delaney, supra note 146; Herbers, The Outer City: A Deep Uneasiness About the Future, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1971, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
205. These considerations are discussed in a survey taken by the Institute of Social Research
of the University of Michigan, in Siegan, supra, note 189.
206. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 197 1), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. May
30, 1972).
207. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
208. For an excellent discussion of these cases see Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in
School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
504 (1972).
209. Cf Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of an
interesting tax base sharing system in use in Minnesota that, if adopted everywhere, would render
moot Serrano and Rodriguez, see Fry, The Plankinton Plan, 3 INTELLECTUAL DIGEST 81 (1972).
Fry suggests that the "Minnesota sharing system . . could help encourage low- and moderate-
income housing throughout [a] region by permitting such housing to 'pay its own way' through
the sharing formula." Id. at 82.
Something like the Minnesota plan is a necessity after Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp.
870 (D. Minn. 1971).
210. Andrews, School Ruling Is Seen Changing the Nature of U.S. Cities, Suburbs, Wall
Street J., Mar. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
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upheld, it is very likely to be of material assistance to the inner cities,
even at the expense of the suburbs. In any case, it will compel the kind
of metropolitan planning that the Balkanization of urban areas has
made most difficult. This is the type of planning that is most likely to
provide solutions to the problems described in this Article.
VI. CONCLUSION
The exclusion of racial and economic minorities from suburbs by
restrictive land use practices is only one note in a discord of urban
problems. It cannot and will not be resolved unless it is recognized as
an integral portion of the much larger overall urban dilemma. Its resolu-
tion will require, among other things, innovative direction and planning
all the way from the federal to the local level, education of suburban
dwellers to demonstrate that some of their fears are unfounded, and
perhaps most of all, a sensitive awareness on the part of the courts and
others that there are compelling social forces at work on both sides of
the controversy, and that failure to recognize the legitimacy of these
interests will only result in stiffening of the opposition.
New political coalitions are being forged in the suburbs, and their
weight is being clearly felt. President Nixon's statement of June 11, 1971
and the Supreme Court's decision in James v. Valtierra demonstrate
that executive and judicial coercion of the suburbs is simply not likely
to occur in the near future. Nevertheless, selfish restrictive land use
practices, such as exclusionary zoning and straitjacket subdivision regu-
lations, are likely to be examined much more carefully in the future than
they have been in the past. To pass muster, the social and environmental
values being served by exclusionary zoning will, of necessity, have to be
much more easily demonstrable.
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